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AUTHOR'S NOTE
I wish to thank the Swiss National Science Foundation for the financial support that
allowed me to complete my research project, “States, Minorities and Conflicts in the
Middle East (1948-2003)”, conducted between 2010-2014 at the Graduate Institute of
International and Development Studies, Geneva. This issue is one of the most valuable
outcomes of that project. However, it goes without saying that the opinions expressed
here belong to no one but the author.
1 When  the  mass  demonstrations  against  the  Turkish  government’s  development
projects  in  Gezi  Park  took  place  between late  May and mid-June  of  2013,  I  was  in
Istanbul, conducting interviews for my own research about the student movements of
the  1960s-1980s  in  Turkey.  Although the  Istanbul-based movement  was  outside  my
sphere of interest,1 I couldn’t help swapping roles from ‘historian’ to ‘anthropologist’
and making regular  visits  to  Gezi  Park to  observe,  in  situ, western Turkey’s  largest
protest movement of the last twenty years. After two weeks going back and forth and
several  discussions  with  protestors,  as  well  as  with  participants  in  the  student
demonstrations of the 1960s-1980s, several observations are I think directly linked to
the subject of this issue of the European Journal of Turkish Studies.
2 Firstly,  the Gezi  Park movement was both leaderless  and extremely heterogeneous,
encompassing  a  wide  variety  of  groups  (environmentalists,  students,  defenders  of
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LGBTQ and women’s rights, etc.) and a broad spectrum of political leanings, ranging
from far left to far right by way of Kemalist-adjacent groups, Islamists and Kurdish
nationalists.2 Alongside groups representing ‘civil  society’  and political,  trade-union
and  professional  organisations  were  a  significant  number  of  protesters  with  no
affiliation,  a  fact  borne out by the results  of  the first  survey conducted during the
protests. Between June 3 and 4, 2013, Esra Ercan Bilgiç and Zehra Kafkaslı, lecturers at
Bilgi  University (Istanbul),  organised a survey of  3,000 protesters gathered between
Gezi Park and Taksim Square. According to the interviews carried out, 70% of protest
participants  claimed  not  to  be  affiliated  with  any  political  party,  the  majority
identifying  as  ‘libertarians’  (özgürlükçü),  while  only  7.7% claimed they  had come to
Taksim square at the encouragement of an organisation, even though more than half of
those surveyed also did not  consider  themselves  ‘apolitical’.  Finally,  53.7% of  those
interviewed stated that this was their first time taking part in a street protest.3
3 Secondly, a large number of the protesters not affiliated with any party or organisation
were predominantly young – a fact again confirmed by the aforementioned survey (40%
between 19-25 years, 24% between 26-30 years) –, students of higher education, middle
class,  secular  –  although  there  were  a  noticeable  number  of  (anti-capitalist  and
feminist) ‘Muslim’ groups – and very plugged into social media. However, their identity
as students did not seem to be the determining factor in this context, as the majority of
protesters had not tried to rally around the few student organisations present at Gezi,
but had come Taksim Square ‘spontaneously’. 
4 Finally,  the university  professors  interviewed in Istanbul  expressed surprise  at  this
sudden  mobilisation,  in  the  mould  of  the  revolts  seen  in  the  Arab  world  between
2010-2011. By their accounts, nothing could have predicted the significant role their
students would play in the Gezi movement. Demonstrations on university grounds were
almost non-existent in the months prior, and support for student unions was at an all-
time low. And yet, the number of third-level students at Gezi was so high that some
university  directors  eventually  proposed  extending  the  end  of  year  exam  period,
despite  pressure  from  YÖK  (the  Board  of  Higher  Education)  and  the  Turkish
government.
5 In  addition,  and  in  step  with  most  of  the  Arab  countries  that  have  seen  popular
uprisings since 2010,  a  “minor” event involving some slightly over-zealous security
forces appears to have driven thousands of people to occupy a defined urban space
(Taksim Square and Gezi Park) – a zone now considered “free” and “protected” – and
contributed  to  an  “expedited”  process  of  socialisation  and  politicisation.  (Fillieule,
2013; 287-308). Despite the violent evacuation of protesters from Gezi on June 15, the
experience  of  ‘occupying’  Istanbul  and  other  Turkish  cities  that  expressed  their
solidarity  with the movement marked,  for  some,  the start  of  a  new era in Turkish
politics; the end of a long ‘cycle of demobilisation’.
6 The intention here is not to analyse these ‘events’ in the purely semantic sense of the
term,4 nor  to  take  a  position  in  the  debate  over  the  end  (or  not)  of  the  ‘cycle  of
demobilisation’ in Turkey and the Middle-East more generally. We propose a different
focus,  one which draws from two sources.  Acknowledging the mass demonstrations
around  Gezi  Park  and  their  ramifications  across  Turkey  (Bilgin,  2013;  Gökay  and
Xypolia, 2013; Kongar and Küçükkaya, 2013; Özbank, 2013, Yıldırım, 2013) while also
heeding  the  call  of  Olivier  Fillieule  and  other  researchers  to  further  examine  the
phenomenon  of  activist  defection  (Filleule,  2005;  Fuchs-Ebaugh,  1988;  Björgo  and
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Horgan,  2009),  this  issue  aims  to  scrutinise  some  of  the  dominant  paradigms
surrounding  core  issues  that  remain  under-investigated  in  the  study  of  collective
action;  namely,  its  decline,  and  in  particular,  questions  relating  to  individual
disengagement and collective mobilisation.
7 To do  this,  the  contributions  included in  this  special  issue,  which  are  drawn from
various disciplines (history, political science, sociology), address a range of different
territories (from Turkey to Mexico by way of Egypt and Morocco) and are cognisant of
early analyses of individual disengagement in countries where mass demonstrations
have recently occurred (Egypt and Morocco), are focused on a specific social group:
students  of  higher-level  education.  Students  were  considered  the  leaders  of  social
change in the years after the Second World War, particularly in developing countries.
However, while students of higher education are the starting point for all the articles
included in this issue, several authors have also added a minor or major focus on other
important actors in the university sphere. 
8 Student  movements  certainly  do  not  occur  in  isolation;  they  are  positioned  in
interrelation  with  numerous  actors  belonging  not  only  to  the  sphere  of  higher
education  (coordinating  bodies  of  higher-level  institutions,  professors,  deans,
chancellors,  lecturers)  but  also  with  other  categories  that  must  be  taken  into
consideration (‘Foyers Idéalistes’ [Trans. note: Ülkü Ocakları, a Turkish ultranationalist
militant  group],  intellectuals,  political  parties,  second-level  schools,  security  forces,
etc).  Accordingly,  some  submissions  have  tackled  the  challenge  of  studying  the
phenomenon of  individual  disengagement among higher education students  from a
process-  and/or  relation-based  perspective,  incorporating  both  long-term
developments and actors who, as part of their mission, have decisively impacted both
mobilisation and disengagement among the student population.
9 Naturally,  the  issue  contains  a  number  of  blind  spots,  such  as  examining  the
phenomenon  of  individual  disengagement  within  Islamist-oriented  political
movements.  Furthermore,  future  analyses  rooted firmly in  a  comparative  approach
should  help  advance  our  understanding  of  an  issue  that  remains  largely  neglected
within research on social mobilisation.
 
The “front line” of the nation
10 Our interest in students of higher education has multiple roots. The Middle-East has a
tradition of mass student demonstrations, going back to at least the early 20th century.
The  considerable  engagement  of  students  in  secondary  schools  and  on  university
campuses, as well as in national-level political debates, made them a true social and
symbolic  force  within  the  Arab  world  (Abdalla,  1985;  Haggai,  1989;  Bashkin,  2009; 
Watenpaugh,  2002:  325-347)  in  the  fight  against  colonialism.  The  expansion  of
compulsory  education  and  universities  from  the  1950s  on,  as  well  as  the
‘modernisation’ projects of the new state elites, only strengthened the student position
at the forefront of the region’s society and politics. In the process, the universities and
colleges of the post-colonial era inherited a dual role: “servant of the State and crucible
for nation-building” [Trans. note: “service de l’État et creuset de la construction nationale”]
(Rey, 2010: 29).5
11 However, the opening up of colleges and universities,  previously characterised by a
certain elitism, to a greater number of students lead to a series of significant socio-
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political transformations throughout the 1960s-1970s:6 the spectrum of students’ social,
ethnic and religious backgrounds broadened considerably; a process of massification
occurred in some universities,  provoking tension around the resources allocated to
education; and finally,  the emergence of ‘students’  as a distinct social group, which
translated into the first state political initiatives aimed specifically at the ‘youth’ – still
thought  of  primarily  as  the  ‘educated  and urban youth’7–  with  the  creation of  the
ministries of youth and education in the 1970s-1980s. 
12 In many Arab countries faced with the accelerating disappearance of pluralism and
freedom of expression in the political sphere, from Tunisia to Iraq by way of Egypt, the
university  became,  a  “substitute  political  arena”  [Trans.  note:  “champ  politique  de
substitution”] to varying degrees, as well as a vessel for the “hopes, frustrations and
demands” [Trans. note: “aspirations, des frustrations et des revendications”] (Guiter, 1997:
93) of Arab societies in a post-colonial environment. During the 1960-1980s, university
students positioned themselves at the spearhead of societal debates, particularly (in
both a metaphorical and a literal sense) in the clashes between the various political
currents  dominating the Middle-East  as  a  region:  communism,  Pan-Arabism,  Arabic
socialism and Islamism.
13 Turkey, having never experienced colonialism, followed a unique path of development
in the first half of the 20th century. As a result, unlike in the majority of Arab nations,
Turkish  universities  remained  outside  the  sphere  of  colonial  influence.  Under  the
Republic of 1923,  higher education was seen by the modern elites as a key tool for
modernising Turkish society and creating “True Turks” (öz Türkler) loyal to the Turkish
republic.  While all  groups in Turkish society had some responsibility in the task of
modernising Turkey, the (educated) ‘youth’ had a special role to play. In his famous
Speech (Nutuk) delivered in October 1927, Mustafa Kemal sacrilised the task bestowed
on the youth by the State: “ Oh, Turkish youth, we have built the Republic; it is up to
you breathe life into it and allow it to grow” [Trans. note: “Ô jeunesse turque, nous avons
bâti la République, c’est à vous de la faire vivre et de lui permettre de s’élever”] (Kemal, 1989:
1197). This has been noted by Leyla Neyzi, among other authors (Neyzi, 2001: 411-432:
Lüküslü,  2005:  31-32).  However,  the  conception  of  ‘youth’  presented  in  Kemalist
discourse was a construction of the state;  in other words:  “The youth received this
mission,  they did not choose it  for themselves” [Trans.  note:  “la  jeunesse reçoit  cette
mission, elle ne se l’octroie pas”] (Şeni, 2007: 241). 
14 There were dedicated national youth holidays, and attention was paid to education.
From 1924 onwards,  the law for  the unification of  education placed all  educational
institutions under the control of the national Ministry of Education. Additionally, all
religious  schools  were  closed.  The  majority  of  university  graduates  was  recruited
straight into the civil service, leaving the private sector of the economy “abandoned”
[Trans.  note:  “orphelin”]  (Aypay,  2003:  109-135).  In  1937,  the  Reorganisation  Law
decided on the closure of the first Ottoman university – Darülfünün (1863) – in order to
make  way  for  Istanbul  University.  The  universities  act  of  1946  granted  complete
autonomy to centres of higher education, and between 1956 and 1960, the number of
university students grew from 20,000 to 65,0000 (Szyliowicz, 1973: 417). 
15 Certain tensions regarding the resources allocated to universities notwithstanding, the
student body, in contrast to the Arab countries, did not establish itself as a force for
protest.  This was because,  as  we have seen,  students were ideologically locked into
defending the values of a republic which happened not to have experienced colonial
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influence. The reality was that the majority of student organisations of this period,
contrary to certain preconceived notions that too often label student movements as
exclusively left-wing, were positioned firmly on the right of the political chessboard,
their sole credo being Atatürkist nationalism.
16 After the Second World War, however, Turkey’s path of development was comparable
to that of the other Middle-Eastern countries. As such, in 1946, the university system
became one of the core points of debate in Turkish politics due to the simultaneous
introduction of both political pluralism and the law on the autonomy of universities
(Turan,  2010:  142-164).  In  addition,  attempting  to  meet  the  pressing  demands  of  a
rapidly growing youth that had its sights set on becoming a key actor in the nation’s
economic and political structures, the Turkish state supported the construction of new
universities across the country. Thus, between 1957 and 1977, the number of Turkish
universities  grew  from  six  to  seventeen,  while  the  number  of  students  went  from
65,000 to 340,000 (Ozankaya, 1978). 
17 These developments, concurrent with the events of history both international (the Cold
War,  the  Cyprus  Crisis,  increased  internationalisation  of  the  Turkish  economy,
reinforcement of America’s presence in the region) and domestic (rapid urbanisation,
social tension and proletarianisation of the economy, growing tensions between the
Kemalist  left  and  the  conservative  right,  military  interventionism  in  the  country’s
politics), propelled vast numbers of high school and university students to the centre of
Turkey’s  social  and  political  stage.  (Alper,  2010).  Universities,  as  “hosts  to  these
processes  of  polarisation  and  escalating  violence,  consequently  became  sites  of
politicisation of the individual” [Trans. note: traversées par ces processus de polarisation et
de montée de violence, deviennent alors des sites de politisation des individus”] (Gourisse, 2010:
362).
18 However, it is worth paying special attention to the role played by university students
over  these  two  decades  for  a  number  of  other  reasons.  First,  the  ‘alliance’  forged
between university students and professors, leftist intellectuals and the ‘progressivist’
factions of  the army that  laid the groundwork for the coup d’état  of  May 27,  1960
cemented higher-level students into a central role in the Turkish activist sphere from
that point on (Mutlu Ulus, 2011); students considered themselves to have a moral duty
and felt unable to simply turn their back on their ‘responsibilities’. This alliance also
paved the way for a partial liberalisation of the country’s political and social arenas, as
well as for the expansion of leftist forces from across the entire spectrum within trade
unions, politics and student circles (Abadan, 1963; Aydınoğlu, 2011). Furthermore, the
participation of university students in the demonstrations that led to the military coup
d’état of May 27, 1960 left a deep impression on the “generation of ‘68” (Monceau, 2007:
97-130), which hoped in vain for an adapted broad alliance of the ‘progressivist’ groups
that would bring about the ‘socialist revolution’ in Turkey. 
19 Second,  higher-level  students  played  a  major  role  in  the  politicisation  of  “young
wolves”  in  high schools  of  big  cities  like  Istanbul  and Ankara.  Accounts  by  former
activists  provide evidence that  university activists  oversaw certain activities  by the
secondary  school  students  –  sit-ins,  marches,  acts  of  sabotage  –  provided  written
propaganda – brochures, flyers – to their youngest acolytes and sometimes physically
protected if they felt threatened by their “enemies” on their way home from school
(Mardin,  1977:  229-254).8 Their  knowledge of  the “terrain” let  them quickly rebuild
trust  with  old  followers,  who  had  since  become  ringleaders  inside  the  secondary
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schools,  thus  demonstrating  the  importance  of  the  self-perpetuation  dynamic  for
politicisation within the student circle (Crossley, 2008: 19-38). In this way, the youngest
university activists became the critical  link to achieving coordination between high
schools  and  universities,  and  ultimately,  to  coordinating  the  mass  student
demonstrations of the 1960-1970s.9
20 Third,  “revolutionary  passions”  (Bozarslan,  Bataillon  and  Jaffrelot,  2011),  with  its
attending urban violence, struck university students first.  Little by little,  clashes on
campus and in the streets between far left and far right (the ‘Grey Wolves’) activists
became  interspersed  with  other,  more  violent  actions.  From  1970  onwards,  some
radical-leftist  groups  shifted  to  urban  guerrilla  warfare  in  order  to  hasten  the
‘revolution’. While the coup d’état of 1971 put a temporary halt to student activities,
the repression aimed primarily at leftist organisations and the execution of university
leaders such as Deniz Gezmiş  in 1972 had a counter-productive effect;  they created
‘youth’ icons, ‘heroes’ fighting for the ‘resistance’ against ‘imperialism’ and ‘fascism’.10
Paradoxically, but in line with an approach similar to that of the extreme left in Japan,
Italy and Germany, the radicalisation of certain student organisations led to the left-
wing  forces  becoming  progressively  marginalised,  weakened  both  by  successive
divisions and repression by a state apparatus that was increasingly establishing itself as
a “fragmented tyranny” [Trans. note: “tyrannie fragmentée”] (Tilly, 2003).
21 Finally, alongside this last point, examining the university student community allows
for  up-close  examination  of  both  the  new techniques  of  repression  applied  by  the
Turkish state (and elsewhere in the Middle East), intended to depoliticise a ‘youth’ that
had become a threat to social order, and the new forms of re-engagement that arose in
an environment seemingly marked by social demobilisation. In practice, the coup d’état
of  September  12,  1980  dealt  a  fatal  blow  to  the  ‘revolutionary  left’  and  associated
movements,  while  right-wing  organisations  were  targeted  less  by  the  punitive
measures.  Intellectuals, student  leaders  and  grassroots  activists  were  detained,
tortured and, in some cases, condemned to exile.  The tally of the military putsch –
650,000 arrests, 1,683,000 judicial investigations, 517 death sentences (49 of which were
carried  out),  30,000  public  service  employees  dismissed,  667  organisations  and
foundations banned, hundreds of suspicious deaths – is unequivocal (Massicard, 2010: 6;
Duclert, 2010: 32).
22 At the same time, the state was developing insidious techniques to depoliticise Turkish
society,  particularly  the  student  sphere.  This  led  to  YÖK  becoming  one  of  the
cornerstones of the university ‘normalisation’ policy. Founded in November 1981 under
law No. 2547 on higher education, the organisation was central to the depoliticisation
and, ultimately,  the collective demobilisation of university students,  as described in
Murat Yılmaz’s contribution to this issue.  New administrative regulations,  stripping
universities of their autonomy and the surveillance of students and teachers were used
to  ‘pacify’  campuses,  while  a  military-neoliberal  coalition  allowed  a  partial
implementation of the Turko-Islamic synthesis11 in universities (Ateş, 1984; Dinç, 1986;
Şimşek, 2006). 
23 Paradoxically, despite the reforms introduced by successive governments to try and fit
Turkey  to  meet  the  European  Union’s  requirements  regarding  YÖK  and  face  the
criticisms  levelled  against  it  by  numerous  intellectuals  (and  even  the  majority  of
parties sitting in government), this embarrassing (to say the least) relic of the military
intervention of 1980 has been neither abolished nor significantly reformed, thanks to
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the political stranglehold it provides over the university system – something that no
party in power has been prepared to sacrifice (Monceau, 2005: 129-142; Yılmaz, 2012:
153-168).
 
On the “cycle of demobilisation”
24 Collective  demobilisation  and disengagement  are  seen  by  researchers  as  social  and
individual  processes  that  encompass  a  range  of  phenomena:  from the  almost  total
political demobilisation of a society to activist individuals retreating into the private
sphere or “exiting” (Hirschman, 1983). In truth, however, beneath this individual and/
or collective retreat lie much more complex social dynamics.
25 In  his  very thought-provoking work of  synthesis,  Sociologie  politique  du  Moyen-Orient
(2010), Hamit Bozarslan highlights a fundamental contradiction that researchers – be
they historians, political scientists or sociologists – must consider when studying the
countries of the Middle East. While on the macro level, we see a “glaring [...] absence of
collective action” [Trans. note: “faiblesse […] criante de l’action collective”] between 1980
and 2010 (with a few exceptions), the micro level reveals “a myriad of actions and acts
of resistance” [Trans. note: “myriade d’engagements et d’actes de resistance”] (Bozarslan,
2010:  65).  In  this  regard,  the  author  points  to the  need to  consider  not  only  the
processes of demobilisation which have been at work for decades in some countries,
but also the reach of quotidian collective actions; the “everyday forms of resistance”
beloved of James C. Scott (1985; 1990), the “bottom-up politics” elevated in the works of
Jean-François Bayart (2008) or the cumulative practices of “non-movements”, a concept
put forward more recently by Asef Bayat (Bayat, 2010). 
26 While this contradiction is still relevant, Bozarslan makes the deliberate choice not to
turn to the sociology of social movements and collective action, a field too often mired
in  “somewhat  abstract  modelling  practices”  [Trans.  note:  “modélisations  quelque  peu
abstraites”]. Instead, he takes an approach grounded in historical sociology, in the vein
of Charles Tilly, which pays special attention to the mechanisms and processes that aid
the study of the consistencies and explanatory principles of mobilisation (Bozarslan,
2010:  65).  Thus,  it  is  from a  macro-sociological  and long-term perspective  that  the
author  regards  the  1940-1970s  as  a  “period  of  mobilisation”,  owing  to  a  “de  facto
alliance  between  the  civil  and  military  intelligentsia,  the  university-level  and
secondary-level  youth and the working class” [Trans.  note:  “période  de  mobilisation…
alliance de fait entre l’intelligentsia civile et militaire, la jeunesse universitaire et lycéenne et la
classe  ouvrière”],  in  contrast  to  the  three  subsequent  decades  of  “general
demobilisation” (1980-2010). The ‘street’ was gradually abandoned in favour of forums
of  dissent  that  were  less  vulnerable  to  state  coercion,  such  as  residential
neighbourhoods or remote regions where Islamist groups and ‘separatist’ groups like
the PKK in Turkey were being revived (Bozarslan, 2010: 69-81). 
27 Written accounts by former activists, primarily on the left, as well as works based on
oral history tend to further support this division of the time period. Indeed, several
‘witnesses’ to the ‘revolutionary’ years have actually highlighted their sense of having
been swept up by an invisible force, an all-powerful and irresistible wave of energy:
“We were all involved in those days” and “it was difficult not to be politicised” [Tran.
note: “à cette époque, on était tous engages” … “il était difficile de ne pas être polities”] are a
few of the statements that surface regularly in interviews with former activists, as well
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as in their autobiographies (Harun, 1975; Yüksel, 1992; Oral, 2003; Mater, 2009). While
such remarks may well illustrate the uncertainty and radicalisation that formed the
backdrop of the period, they nonetheless create a narrative that leaves no space to
consider  the  varying  degrees  of  engagement  amongst  higher-level  students  or  the
differences in mobilisation between universities, or even between colleges within the
same  university.  For  instance,  it  should  be  noted  that  the  involvement  of  many
‘activists’ between 1960-1970 was limited to sometimes one-off, ‘acritical’ participation
in the protests, boycotts and sit-ins organised by ‘real’ leaders. As with any individual,
or indeed collective, memory, what is really at play is the construction of a selective
narrative that broadly aims to legitimise the choices made by the actors during and after
their period of involvement.
28 Furthermore,  as  Emin  Alper  points  out,  the  accounts  of  the  various  political
generations connected to both the ‘great demonstrations’ of the university sphere and
Turkey’s  military  coups  (Monceau,  2007)  have  become  a  twofold  ‘burden’  for  new
generations of activists. On the one hand, comparison of the protests of 1990-2000 to
the “golden age” of political engagement has given rise to a shared sense of guilt and
failure  among  Turkish  students,  “incapable”  of  repeating  the  “feats”  [Trans.  note:
“gestes”] of their elders (Alper, 2009: x). On the other hand, the shadow of the “heroic”
generations still  hangs over the young activists of today, so much so that the “‘90s
generation” – considered to be apolitical, consumerist and passive (Lüküslü, 2005) – are
viewed in public opinion as their antithesis. 
29 In this issue, we have opted to alternate between different scales of analysis – macro,
meso  and  micro  –  in  order  to  refine  several  findings  around  the  process  of
demobilisation and the factors contributing to disengagement. Placing these different
levels of inquiry in dialogue with each other allows us to consider a range of variables,
such as the degree of students’ engagement, multiple affiliations, organisation types,
costs and rewards, repertoires of collective action and ‘biographical’ details. 
30 To  what  degree  are  the  dichotomies  between  ‘mobilisation/demobilisation’  and
‘politicised/apolitical’  relevant  beyond  the  macro  level  when  considering  the
phenomenon of activist defection? What do the most detailed analyses of meso-level
trends,  “which  shape  and  support  collective  action  over  time”  [Trans.  note:  “qui
façonnent et soutiennent l’action collective dans le temps”] (McAdam, 2005: 53), and micro-
level  trends  reveal  about  collective  demobilisation  and  individual  disengagement?
Likewise, how does a processual analysis of disengagement help us grasp the factors
(the ‘why’) and trajectories (the ‘how’) of the phenomenon? The contributions in this
issue take these questions as the starting point for a double-pronged goal. First, while
acknowledging the impact of repression and the undermining of political opportunity
in an authoritarian or quasi-authoritarian setting,  they refine understanding of  the
direct  link,  too  often  assumed  as  self-evident,  between  coercion  and  individual
disengagement  (Combes  and  Fillieule,  2011:  1047-1072).  Second,  based  on  an
examination of student movements from a variety of countries and periods, the articles
as a whole open the door to possibly identifying variations concerning both the degree
of demobilisation of organisations and the impact of repression on groups and their
activists in relation to different stages, as well as the relationship between personal
resources and the costs of disengagement.
31 Certainly,  the  collective  demobilisation  of  the  student  community  in  Turkey  may
readily  be  explained  by  a  number  of  structural  factors  broadly  shared  by  other
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countries  both near and far,  such as  the active ‘depoliticisation’  policy imposed on
universities  by  YÖK,  the  global  decline  of  leftist  ideologies,  ‘neoliberal’  education
reforms  that  have  spurred  increased  competition  between  students  in  the  ‘global
university’ (Marginson, 2008: 87-107), the impoverishment of public universities and
consequent ‘desacrilisation’ of their legitimacy in society, the economic troubles faced
by Turkey in the 1990s, which prompted higher-level students to realign toward the
centre in their personal goals, or even the ‘societal fatigue’ that affected many spheres
of Turkish society following a period of intense mobilisation that sometimes carried a
significant cost: prison, inability to obtain a college degree, exile, the physical and/or
psychological after-effects of torture, etc. Lastly, we should not forget that thirty years
after  the  coup  d’état  led  by  General  Kenan  Evren,  the  state  repression  executed
between 1980-1983 remains a trauma in Turkey’s collective memory – one that fuels the
idea of activism as a dangerous activity to this day (Berrak Tuna, 2011: 69).12
32 However, while the establishment of YÖK unquestionably had immediate consequences
for student movements generally, the collective demobilisation of the ‘leftist forces’
should not make us forget that Turkish universities witnessed a revival of the student
sphere marked by Islamism (Güven, 2005: 205) and Kurdish nationalism towards the
end of the 1980s.13 In other words, the military intervention of September 1980 gave a
temporary  jolt  to  collective  action,  which  is  understood  as  “any  concerted  action
carried out by one or multiple groups seeking to achieve shared aims” [Trans. note:
“toute  action  concertée  de  un  ou  plusieurs  groupes  cherchant  à  faire  triompher  des  fins
partagées”] (Fillieule, 1993: 9), within the university community and within all spheres
of  Turkish  society.  In  the  medium  to  long  term,  however,  it  had  differing  effects
depending  on  political  leaning  and  movement:  right-wing,  left-wing,  Islamist  or
Kurdish nationalist. Furthermore,  state coercion could not stifle  the engagement of
new generations of students (Birikim, 2011), nor the emergence of new forms of action
within the student community – such as ‘post-it activism’ or distance activism – that
were less risky and less demanding in terms of time, but still taken seriously by the
Turkish government (Berrak Tuna,  2011).  Thus,  a  more fine-grained analysis  of  the
phenomena of demobilisation and individual disengagement is needed.
 
Individual disengagement
33 While Murat Yılmaz’s contribution does, to a great extent, affirm the prominent role of
repression in the collective demobilisation of leftist student communities in Turkey,
Yılmaz also adds several important nuances to this point. First is that not all Turkish
universities were transformed into dissident spaces in the late 1970s. Some universities
stayed away almost entirely from the mass demonstrations, which should indicate the
need  for  further  research  on  the  differing  participation  levels  of  higher  education
students within the same political context. Secondly, he shows how much the response
to repression may vary within the same generation or political cohort. For example,
while  state  repression  certainly  had  biographical  consequences  for  the  activists
interviewed by Yılmaz – prison, torture, temporary/permanent suspension of studies –
it  in no way meant complete disengagement.  They attempted to regroup, but faced
with a highly oppressive environment and a ‘new generation’ of seemingly ‘apolitical’
students, they felt forced to overhaul their action playbook and even to abandon the
university as a privileged site of resistance. 
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34 In fact, in Turkey, as elsewhere in the Middle-East (Duboc, 2010: 61-79; Khawaga, 2003:
271-292),  many ‘former’  activists  maintained long-term engagement (Braungart  and
Braungart,  1993:  62-64)  in  spite  of  their  sometimes  painful  experiences,  continuing
their ‘activist  careers’14 by adopting new forms of ‘apolitical’  engagement or ‘moral
activism’,  as  well  as  working  to  consolidate  ‘civil  society’  in  Turkey  –  professional
associations,  human  rights  defenders,  intellectual  foundations  –  and  foster
particularistic mobilisations, such as Alevism (Massicard, 2010: 1-18). To this effect, the
‘activist reconversions’ of former student activists should prompt us to problematise
the  dichotomy between mobilisation  and demobilisation  (McAdam,  1988),  since  the
disengagement  of  former  ‘real  activists’  does  not  necessarily  mean  actual
disengagement. Very often, what we observe is a phenomenon of re-engagement/re-
disengagement; in other words, an alternation between periods of withdrawal and re-
engagement that  actually  corresponds to an activism trajectory common to a  large
number of individuals (Corrigall-Brown, 2012). 
35 Drawing our attention to another part of the world – Mexico – the collaborative article
by  Guadalupe  Olivier-Téllez,  Sergio  Tamayo  and  Michael  Voegtli  offers  a  similar
examination of the effects of repression on the Mexican student movement of 1968.
This compelling body of ethnographic research highlights how the effects of repression
can vary based not  only  on activists’  plurality  –  their  degree of engagement,  their
biographies,  etc  –  but  also  across  different  time frames.  In  other  words,  the  paper
posits that the effects of repression should be discerned through a processual, dynamic
perspective  –  power/protest  movement/media/counter-movements  –  that  considers
the subjectivities of the actors at each stage of a revolutionary ‘moment’, rather than
assuming that the impact of coercion will be uniform across time.
36 Işıl Erdinç’s text opens the door to a broader examination of the questions in focus. A
study of  the student union at  Genç-Sen,  a higher-level  institution,  shows how much
continuity exists between mobilisations past and present. As such, and in the vein of
Verta  Taylor’s  study on the  American women’s  rights  movement  from 1945  to  the
mid-1960s  (Taylor,  1989:  761-775),  Erdinç  argues  that,  despite  the  repression  that
followed the coup d’état of 1980, the link between some of today’s student movements
and those of the 1960-1970s has never been fully broken, be it only through slogans or
personal  ties  between  new  and  old  generations  of  activists.  Furthermore,  this
continuity may contribute to disengagement if new activists view the attachment to
‘old ideas’ as, essentially, a roadblock to revitalising mobilisation of the student youth.
Facing ‘inertia’,  either real  or imagined,  potential  recruits  will  choose to withdraw,
either to seek out a new experience in a different movement or to remain among the
‘apolitical  masses’  denounced,  sometimes  unfairly,  by  a  large  segment  of  public
opinion.
37 But the reality is that multiple factors contribute to demobilisation, none of which is
necessarily linked to the authoritarian or semi-authoritarian nature of the regime in
power.  Joseph  Hivert’s  paper  on  Morocco’s  ‘February  20’  movement  presents  a
compelling hypothesis:  when activists  are  poorly  dispersed and/or  the  capacity  for
collective action is low, the probability of defection increases. As such, even if activists
who have  chosen to  ‘exit’  may,  at  first  glance,  give  other  reasons  to  ‘justify’  their
disengagement – such as their demands having been met – it is the lack of biographical
availability, and not necessarily the political environment, that proves the determining
factor for a certain type of activist.
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38 Benjamin Geer’s analysis of the “March 9 Group”, the movement of faculty members
striving for the autonomy of universities in Egypt, presents a very rich paradox. While
traditional structural analysis of activist engagement would stress the importance of
favourable  conditions –  notably,  a  democratic  framework –  for  the development of
social  mobilisation,  Geer’s  case  study  challenges  the  underlying  principles  of  this
approach by examining the structure of political opportunities. Geer shows how, in an
authoritarian or semi-authoritarian environment, the movement sparked in 2004 by
academics aiming to defend the autonomy of  universities allowed these activists  to
establish themselves as a point of reference for ‘pro-democracy’ student bodies and
intellectuals.  In  contrast,  the  same  cultural  and  symbolic  capital  –  reputation,
recognition,  popularity  –  lost  its  value  in  a  (theoretically)  more  favourable  setting
following the fall of ‘dictator’ Hosni Moubarak and the start of a period of uncertainty
and fluidity (Dobry, 1986) ushered in by the popular revolts in Egypt. This loss of capital
led to  the defection of  a  portion of  the activists,  namely university  professors  and
lecturers, who saw the return on their engagement, whether objective or subjective, as
minimal.
39 The revolts in the Arab world between 2010 and 2011, the ‘indignados’ movement in
Spain, ‘Occupy Wall Street’ in New York and the ‘resistance’ in Istanbul’s Gezi Park have
once again reminded researchers that mass demonstrations and dissidence are topics
worthy of  study,  as  the number of  publications and conferences dedicated to them
attests.  Beyond  this,  does  the  revival  of  student  demonstrations  in  Egyptian
universities  in  2013  –  or  the  protests  of  students  of  the  Middle  East  Technical
University in Ankara against the construction of a motorway threatening to destroy a
large  swathe  of  their  tree-lined  campus  –  herald  the  return of  the  university  as  a
bastion of protest in the Middle East (Akyol, 2013; Hamed, 2013; Mohammed, 2013)? It
is, of course, still too early to answer such a question. For now, it would seem that while
the university is again a space of dissidence, it is not the privileged site of protest in
these countries. Whatever the case, and somewhat against the tide, this issue hopes to
have  contributed  to  the  understanding  of  demobilisation  and  disengagement  as
phenomena through examination of the student community, highlighting once again
that both of these are, in spite of everything, an ingrained part of social movements
and social mobilisation.
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NOTES
1. The Gezi demonstrations opposed the pedestrianisation of Taksim Square, the demolition of
Gezi Park and the construction, in its place, of a replica Ottoman military barracks containing a
shopping centre and a mosque.
2. For analyses written during the protests, see the blog of the IFEA [Trans. note: the French
Institute  for  Anatolian  Studies]  (http://ovipot.hypotheses.org/page/2)  and  Jadaliyya-Turkey
(http://turkey.jadaliyya.com/).
3. Between June 6 and 7, 2013, the private company KONDA conducted a second survey of 4,411
participants, which produced similar results (Kongar and Küçükkaya, 2013).
4. Alongside the semantic sense of the term “event”, Bénédicte Récappée echoes Paul Ricoeur, for
whom “not  everything  that  happens  is  an  event”  [Trans.  note:  “tout  ce  qui  arrive  ne  fait  pas
événement”]  when  she  writes  that  “the  importance  of  the  way  in  which  facts  are  perceived
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reminds  us  of  the  constructed  nature  of  the  event,  from  perception  to  recounting,  from
interpretation to transmission” [Trans. note: “l’importance de la façon dont les faits sont perçus nous
rappelle  le  caractère construit  de l’événement,  de sa perception à son récit,  de son interprétation à sa
transmission”] (Récappé, 2009: 210).
5. Thus, for example, Fadhil Abbas al Mahdawi, presidential court judge under d’Abdul Karim
Kassem in Iraq, declared that: “Students all over the world are soldiers of science, literature and
arts, which are the essential elements of building nations and bringing progress to countries […].
Besides students are always soldiers of justice, democracy, liberty and peace”. Hoover Institution
Archives, U.S.N.S.A, Box 221. “L’étudiant irakien”, published by the Fédération générale d’étudiants
dans la République irakienne, n°1, June 1959, p. 3.
6. Following  the  Second  World  War,  new  universities  sprang  up  very  rapidly  all  across  the
Middle-East:  Egypt  (1942,  1949,  1950),  Syria  (1946),  Lebanon (1950),  Libya (1955),  Iraq (1956),
Morocco (1957), Saudi Arabia (1957), Tunisia (1958), Jordan (1962) and Kuwait (1966). While the
academic year 1961-1962 saw 157,00 students spread across the 20 universities then operating in
the Arab world, ten years later, 48 universities took in more than 375,000 higher-level students.
7. The category of ‘youth’ does not refer to a distinct social unit, and thus, cannot be considered a
homogeneous category (Bourdieu, 2002). Furthermore, as historians and anthropologists of the
concept point out, ‘youth’ is a social construct whose definition and attributes vary according to
its historical and socio-economic context. In this sense, the Turkish ‘youth’ of the 1960-1970s,
with its ‘modern’ practices (leisure time, easy access to public transport, dress codes, etc) and
language codes, was limited almost exclusively to students and urban youth (Bayat, 2011; Wyn
and White, 1997; Bucholtz, 2002: 525-552; Farag, 2007: 49-78; Mauger, 2010: 9-24).
8. While right-wing students were trained in the ‘foyers idéalistes’ (Can, 2000: 335-373), training
of activists on the left tended to take place on university grounds and in student dormitories.
Notable among the left-wing student unions from 1964 onwards were the Thought Clubs (Fikir
Kulüpleri),  which  became  the  Revolutionary  Youth  Organisation  (Türkiye  Devrim  Gençlik
Teşkilatı or Dev-Genç) in 1969 (Feyizoğlu, 2002).
9. The mass demonstrations of the 1960-1970s should not blind us to the fact that, despite the
image portrayed in the memoirs of old activists and by the newspapers of the time, the majority
of students did not belong to a student union. Hence, according to a survey carried out in 1955 at
Ankara University, 78.2% of respondents were not registered with any student organisation, 19%
were members of a non-political student organisation and 3.8% were part of a political student
organisation (Dirks, 1975: 261). Similarly, while there is proof of some student involvement in
armed combat  groups,  it  was  still  a  rare  phenomenon.  The engagement  level  of  ‘politicised’
students varied greatly and should not be overestimated.
10. Deniz Gezmiş was the leader of the People’s Liberation Army of Turkey (THKO). Other similar
groups included the Workers and Peasants Liberation Army of Turkey (TIKKO) and the People's
Liberation Party-Front of Turkey (THKP).
11. The Turko-Islamic synthesis, as an underpinning ideology of Turkish politics since 1980, was
nothing  new in  terms of  the  intertwining  of  Islam and Turkism.  Developed in  the  “Turkish
salons” of the mid-20th century, it was applied in practice following the military coup of 1980,
and  was  particularly  present  in  the  spirit  of  the  constitution  of  1982,  which  introduced
‘authoritarian  democracy’,  an  end  to  the  autonomy  of  universities,  the  formation  of  State
Security Courts and a centralised administrative system (Üstel, 1994: 387-400). 
12. A perception that is by no means inaccurate. Activism in Turkey remains a risky choice, as
proven by the waves of arrests that followed the evacuation of Gezi Park in July 2013. More
broadly, it is notable that Turkey has been condemned by the European Court of Human Rights
on several  occasions  for  failing  to  respect  freedom of  expression  and for  abuses  committed
against activists in detention. In the student community alone, the Initiative for Solidarity with
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Incarcerated  Students  (TÖDI)  has  documented  around  eight  hundred  students  behind  bars,
awaiting trial or serving a sentence, of whom ninety percent are Kurds (Girardot, 2013: 29). 
13. Through  my  2013  survey  of  students  who  had  attended  Dicle  University  in Diyarbakır
between 1986 and 1990,  I  was  able  to  conclude that  the  student  movement  in  this  majority
Kurdish  city  was  a  reality.  Yet,  unlike  in  the  late  1970s,  ethnic  claims  within  the  student
movement became hegemonic, to the detriment of groupings aligned with the Turkish left. 
14. Howard Becker (Becker, 1985) expanded the concept of the career, in the sense of profession,
to include different manifestations of engagement. The idea of an ‘activist career’, subsequently
adopted by other researchers within the sociology of mobilisations (Filleule, 2001: 199-217), is
desirable  in  that  it  emphasises  the  processual  aspect  of  activist  trajectories  as  well  as  the
interconnectedness between individual stories and the broader situational context. 
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The uprisings that erupted unexpectedly in the Middle East between 2010 and 2011 propelled the
region’s youth to the forefront of the political and media spheres. According to some scholars, we
are  witnessing  a  re-politicisation  of  Middle  Eastern  youth,  a  marked  contrast  to  their
‘depoliticisation’ and ‘apathy’ as a group in recent years. Yet, although the youth (incidentally,
the  majority  of  the  population  in  the  region)  have  unquestionably  participated  in  popular
protests, student unions seem not to have played a role thus far. From a macro-level perspective,
the marginal role of student associations may seem natural; whilst nationalist and revolutionary
leaders encouraged students to actively participate in politics ‘for the sake of the nation’ until
the 1960s,  both revolutionary and conservative regimes progressively sought to ‘depoliticize’
them. This turned higher education into a privileged ‘sandbox’ for testing methods of repression
which  would  then  be  extended  to  all  segments  of  society.  However,  while  scholars  should
consider the political context of a given society, namely, the authoritarian or semi-authoritarian
regimes of most Middle Eastern countries, we must ask: what can meso- and micro-level analysis
reveal  about  the  complex  and  multi-layered  phenomena  of  collective  demobilization  and
individual  disengagement?  This  special  issue  offers  some responses  to  that  central  question,
analysing different case studies within higher education, from Turkey and Egypt to Morocco and
Mexico, over the last forty years.
INDEX
Keywords: demobilization, disengagement, militant trajectories, repression, higher education
AUTHORS
JORDI TEJEL GORGAS
Research professor of International History at the Graduate Institute of International and
Development Studies, Geneva
Where are all the students? Demobilisation and re-engagement in higher educat...
European Journal of Turkish Studies, 17 | 2013
17
